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I. INTRODUCTION
Standard form contracts appear to present a problem for the efficiency claims of those adhering to the positive law and economics
school.1 Indeed, if we envision economic bargaining as movements
within an Edgeworth box toward the Pareto set,2 one does not quite
know what to do with standard form contracts. This disconnect between bargaining theory and empirical observation led some legal
scholars to view form contracts as adhesion contracts, implying that
they are the result of a powerful party thrusting its preferences on a
helpless party.3 The take-it-or-leave-it nature of these contracts,
which are generally drafted by the seller of a good or service, casts
doubt on the usual assumption that market competition maximizes
consumer surplus.
However, the idealized world of the Edgeworth box does not discuss the process by which buyers and sellers choose a particular
point on the core of the contract curve within the box, and in reality,
those dynamics will be beset by transactions costs.4 Because those
transactions costs reduce total surplus, individuals will have the incentive to mitigate them. Market forces, then, will tend to drive
profit-maximizing sellers to settle on standard contract terms that

* Assistant Professor of Law and Courtesy Professor of Economics, Florida State
University; Ph.D. (economics) and J.D., George Mason University.
1. For a discussion of the lines of separation among the major movements in law and
economics, see Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick, Functional Law and Economics: The
Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431 (2004).
2. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 515-25 (1995). An
Edgeworth box is a graphical device which may be used to depict a simple economy with
two commodities and two consumers. Id. at 515-16. The Pareto set is the collection of all
“Pareto optimal allocations”—outcomes to which “there is no alternative feasible outcome
at which every individual in the economy is at least as well off and some individual is
strictly better off.” Id. at 522-23.
3. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943).
4. Defining a determinative solution to which point will be reached along the contract curve is a difficult task and requires some fairly restrictive assumptions. For one example of how scholars have attempted to solve this problem, see John F. Nash, Jr., The
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 155-62 (1950).
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are optimal in terms of maximizing total surplus generated through
trade.5 Standardizing terms eliminates the need for a producer to
bargain with all of his customers individually, saving the attendant
costs of bargaining, including the agency costs involved in delegating
bargaining authority to nonowner operators. Cooter and Ulen make a
point to differentiate between standardized contracts that increase
efficiency and contracts of adhesion that result from a seller’s monopoly position in the market.6
In judging the welfare implication of standardization, then, Cooter
and Ulen suggest that the important question is whether the underlying market is competitive or monopolistic.7 Posner echoes this when
he writes that the important consideration is “whether competition
forces sellers to incorporate in their standard contracts terms that
protect the purchasers.”8
This efficiency view implies that in competitive markets, standardized terms will benefit buyers. A corollary to this is that if we
observe “abusive” standardized terms, the market is presumptively
monopolistic. Casual observation suggests that standardized contracts are nearly ubiquitous,9 and a great many of the standardized
terms appear to benefit the seller to the potential detriment of the
buyer.
What can we make of this inconvenient mismatch between theory
and data? If abusive contract terms are the norm, does that imply
that many markets are monopolistic? Such a deduction flies in the
face of modern industrial organization, which suggests that the conditions required for competition are relatively lenient. The theory of
contestable markets tells us that as long as market entry and exit
are reasonably easy, markets will generate competitive outcomes.10
Further, contestable markets theory implies that technological advances will lead to easier entry and greater competition. While we
should be observing increasing competition, we also appear to be seeing an increase in the use of supposedly abusive standardized contract terms.
5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 116 (6th ed. 2003).
6. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 288 (4th ed. 2004).
7. Id. at 289.
8. POSNER, supra note 5, § 4.8, at 116.
9. For example, Hillman and Rachlinski suggest that “[p]eople encounter standard
forms in most of their contractual endeavors.” Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435 (2002) (citing
John J.A. Burke, Contracts as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 285, 290 (2000)).
10. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1988); William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); William J. Baumol
et al., Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Reply, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 491 (1983).
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Inconvenient empirical observations such as this have provided
the major impetus for the behavioral economics movement. When
parsimonious models constructed from concave utility functions
failed to provide implications that survive testing, some economists
began to look to psychology for insights to explain the data. While
there are certainly gains from interdisciplinary trade to be exploited,
many law and economics scholars seem to forget what the comparative advantage of economic analysis is: Economic theory generates
testable hypotheses about cross-sectional and time-series variation in
behavior.
Once theories are rigorously tested, they can provide insight for
policy. If the theory fails to be supported by the data, we should reject the theory, not the method. Lack of empirical support does not
suggest that some other particular explanation is correct; it merely
indicates that the tested theory is not correct. In the early stages of
the behavioral economics movement, too often researchers have simply taken some anomalous behavior observed in the lab and used it
as the presumptive null hypothesis that is accepted when the tested
hypothesis, generated by theory, is rejected.
This research strategy could be profitable if the empirical tests
were particularly powerful. However, for most applications, while the
microfoundations of the economic theory are reasonably well specified, the behavioral explanation is often invoked without specifying
its foundations. Such an asymmetry leaves little confidence that a
powerful empirical test can be designed.
Fortunately, it appears as though we are on the cusp of a more
sophisticated integration of psychological insights into the ex ante
assumptions of economic models. This “second-wave behavioral economics” moves beyond the ex post rationalizations of anomalous empirical results and ad hoc criticisms of conventional economic theory
by helping to fill out some of the microfoundations of behavior without abandoning useful economic methods for generating and testing
hypotheses.11 This movement will eventually allow economic research
to better inform policy and judicial decisions. However, until the
movement becomes sufficiently embedded and developed, it is premature to use first-stage behavioral criticisms to supplant insights from
conventional economics in the public decisionmaking process.
In the meantime, law and economics scholars working on applied
issues should be careful not to invoke behavioral explanations—
developed atheoretically on the basis of observation as opposed to
rigorous testing—simply because existing economic theory is not
borne out empirically. Instead, we should adopt behavioral explana11. For a helpful discussion of the integration of this “second-wave,” see Matthew
Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 657 (2002).
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tions only if they can explain systematic cross-sectional and timeseries variation, while keeping in mind that conventional theory
might provide some unexplored insights.
Standard form contracts provide an illustration of an application
for which a behavioral explanation has been suggested because conventional theory has not yet been predictive of empirical observation.
Work by Russell Korobkin provides the strongest argument that
bounded rationality and status quo bias lay at the foundation of
“abusive” standardized terms and lays out the policy implications of
these biases.12
However, although these behavioral biases are consistent with
casual observation of the incidence of standard form contracts, standard economic theory provides an unexplored explanation that is
consistent with the casual empirics too. Specifically, standard form
contracts can exist in fairly competitive markets if consumers exhibit
heterogeneity in time values and sellers can engage in price discrimination on the basis of that heterogeneity through the use of
standardized contracts. By accepting default terms, high-time-value
individuals acquire the product at a higher quality-adjusted price
without expending time to dicker over individual contract terms.
Low-time-value individuals, on the other hand, willingly expend time
haggling over unattractive terms to secure a lower quality-adjusted
price.
This Comment reviews Korobkin’s argument regarding behavioral
bias as the root of standardized contract terms that favor sellers.
Part II briefly discusses the correlates of these biases, suggested by
experimental work, that will be useful in generating predictions
about cross-sectional variation. Part III presents the price discrimination model of standardized contracts. Part IV concludes with a discussion of what empirical evidence would provide powerful support
for the competing explanations of standardized contracts.
II. STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS AS ARTIFACTS OF BEHAVIORAL BIAS
In a series of articles, Russell Korobkin has isolated two behavioral biases that contribute to the existence of standard form contracts.13 Status quo bias is the tendency of individuals to accept existing or default orderings as normative or preferred simply because the
ordering constitutes the status quo.14 In the contract case, this bias
12. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1208-44 (2003).
13. See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract
Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Korobkin, supra note 12.
14. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8-10 (1988). For a formal incorporation of status quo bias
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manifests itself in an individual’s propensity to accept default or
form terms without bargaining over them to achieve more favorable
terms.15 However, while status quo bias might explain why Coasian
bargaining does not take place in individual transactions, it is less
powerful as an explanation of why abusive terms could exist in equilibrium. We would expect competitive forces to eliminate abusive
terms in the long run, because consumers would be drawn to sellers
offering more attractive standard terms as long as search costs are
low and entry is easy.
To explain the durability of abusive terms, Korobkin invokes the
notion of bounded rationality, suggesting that consumers will not
consider all dimensions of product quality because of a limited ability
to process complex information.16 While consumers will pay attention
to and bargain over salient terms, such as price, they will ignore nonsalient terms.17 Sellers will have the incentive to exploit this limited
rationality by proposing abusive non-salient terms and competing
only on the basis of salient terms.18
Korobkin provides substantial experimental evidence that consumers disregard some product attributes in their decisionmaking.19
For example, one review of existing studies cited by Korobkin suggests that consumers generally only compare three products and that
the comparison focuses on no more than five product dimensions,20
although there does appear to be heterogeneity across consumers21
depending on the individuals’ processing abilities.22
Given that consumers will generally consider fewer than the total
number of distinct product attributes, Korobkin suggests that contract terms will often be ignored as consumers devote their attention
and information-processing resources to comparing salient attributes
such as price, appearance, and product function.23 Further, even if
consumers wanted to compare products based on a multitude of
terms, behavioral research suggests that individuals have difficulties

in a rational choice framework, see Yusufcan Masatlioglu & Efe A. Ok, Rational Choice
with Status Quo Bias, 121 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (2005).
15. See Korobkin, supra note 13.
16. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1226-29.
17. Id. at 1229-34.
18. See id. at 1234.
19. Id. at 1226-29.
20. See Denis A. Lussier & Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent
Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 154, 155 (1979).
21. Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision
Making: A Replication and Extension, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
300 (1979).
22. See James Onken et al., Individual Differences in the Use of Simplification Strategies in a Complex Decision-Making Task, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 14 (1985).
23. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1230.

560

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:555

in making trade-offs over dissimilar product attributes.24 That is,
consumers might be unwilling to implicitly price some product attributes, particularly those attributes with strong emotional implications, such as safety.25 Even if individuals were willing to make
trade-offs regarding these emotion-laden attributes, Korobkin draws
on the experimental evidence that individuals are generally poor
probabilistic thinkers to suggest that individuals will make these
trade-offs inefficiently when it comes to terms that only bind with
low probability, such as arbitration requirements.26
Korobkin argues that as firms compete on the basis of salient
product attributes, they have an incentive to offer inefficient nonsalient contract terms.27 That is, if individuals pay the most attention
to price, sellers will use their savings from providing low-quality (ignored) contract terms to lower prices, lowering the total surplus generated from trade.28
Korobkin provides numerical examples in which competition over
salient features leads to an efficiency loss in situations where salience is homogenous across consumers, heterogeneous but randomly
distributed across consumers, heterogeneous across strategic consumers, and endogenous.29 In each case, Korobkin argues that the
likelihood of sellers finding it profitable to offer only efficient contract
terms regarding non-salient features is vanishingly low, leading to
aggregate welfare losses.30
To remedy this possibility of equilibrium inefficient contract
terms, Korobkin suggests that courts enforce all terms that were
clearly salient ex ante, as well as terms for which this determination
is ambiguous.31 Litigants wishing to invalidate a particular term
should be required to present evidence of its non-salience and its inefficiency.32 If the court determines that the contested term was nonsalient and inefficient, it should allow for significant penalties in order to incentivize sellers to draft efficient contract terms.33
Regarding the determination of what constitutes an efficient term,
Korobkin suggests that litigants could present studies detailing the

24. Id.
25. See id.; Jane Beattie & Jonathan Baron, Investigating the Effect of Stimulus
Range on Attribute Weight, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 571, 571 (1991).
26. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1232-34.
27. Id. at 1234.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1232-41.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1280.
32. Id. at 1280-81.
33. See id. at 1284-90 (suggesting nonenforcement as a default remedy for unconscionable terms).
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relative values of buyers’ willingness to pay for high- and low-quality
contract terms net of the marginal savings to the seller in providing
the low-quality term.34 Such studies, however, will be plagued by
many problems. Analysis of market data would not be possible, presumably, given the assumption that the term is non-salient. Therefore, it is unlikely buyers will have priced the term. On the other
hand, survey results come with their own substantial shortcomings.35
Recognizing that this kind of direct evidence might be difficult to collect, Korobkin defaults to the efficiency precepts that are presented
in the law and economics literature, such as assigning risks to the
party best able to minimize expected losses.36
Korobkin’s explanation and examples are rhetorically persuasive.
Further, his argument is advanced by the significant laboratory evidence of individuals’ behavioral biases.37 Before we adopt his prescriptions, however, it might be profitable to inquire whether his hypothesis stands up to empirical testing. The argument certainly is
consistent with the casual observation that potentially abusive contract terms can be found in the real world. However, it is not clear
that the bounded rationality explanation is the best explanation for
this observation.38
A handful of limitations or potential inconsistencies inherent in
the model that is implicit behind Korobkin’s illustrations might limit
its acceptability a priori. The most obvious inconsistency is the different treatment of buyers and sellers. While buyers are assumed to
suffer from significant behavioral biases that are not corrected in any
evolutionary sense,39 sellers are assumed to be able to capitalize on
these biases, despite the fact that doing so would require significant
information and information-processing capabilities.40 Perhaps the
feedback mechanisms on the supply side are stronger, making seller
biases more costly and leading to their remedy through attrition of
34. See id. at 1284.
35. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 45 (discussing the
flaws of contingent value surveys).
36. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1284.
37. Id. at 1225-33.
38. In truth, it is not at all clear that abusive terms do exist. Despite Korobkin’s citation of canonical law and economics literature on what constitutes efficiency in these contexts, some scholars, such as James Buchanan, would argue that value maximization is
tautologically the result of trade. “Individuals make their evaluations of the two commodities only as the trading process takes place, and, without trade, there could be no means of
determining what value is at all.” GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE
REASON OF RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 28 (2000). Thus, any evaluation
of efficiency independent of the trading is impossible. For further discussion of this point,
see Parisi & Klick, supra note 1; and Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Wealth, Utility,
and the Human Dimension, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY (forthcoming 2005).
39. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1218-34.
40. See id. at 1234-39.
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firms that fail to exploit buyer biases. However, one could argue that
a court system that ruthlessly enforces contracts would make buyer
biases more costly, leading to their mitigation or elimination. It is not
at all clear that we are better off, in a dynamic sense, when existing
biases are reinforced through the protective shield of courts.
Further, it is not evident from Korobkin’s presentation whether
the low-price/inefficient non-salient-terms result is sustainable in
equilibrium even in a system that enforces all contract terms. Korobkin too easily rejects the argument that consumers’ salience profiles
will change once a low-probability event occurs, imposing a reputation cost on firms offering inefficient contract terms.41 This is a bit
cavalier since much depends on the product involved and the salience
differentials held by consumers. Formal modeling of the conditions
under which reputation lacks disciplinary force might allow us to
better target the areas where Korobkin’s prescriptions are most necessary, without applying them across the board, even in situations
where abusive contract terms are a disequilibrium phenomenon that
will be remedied without judicial intervention. Perhaps more importantly, by asserting that such low-probability events will have little
effect on seller incentives,42 Korobkin is unwittingly suggesting that
the welfare increases from his prescriptions will be quite small and
may well not be cost-justified, even if they require only trivial inquiry
costs. That is, perhaps the reason that certain terms are systematically non-salient is because their ultimate importance is trivial.
Lastly, Korobkin’s examples assume that all markets are pooled
such that sellers will offer all customers an identical product even if
their preferences and salience profiles are heterogeneous.43 However,
it could be the case that firms offer differentiated products to consumers and use the standard form contract to engage in a type of
price discrimination. While such price discrimination may fall short
of first-best efficiency, it may be welfare-enhancing relative to the
pooled equilibrium, suggesting that failure to enforce the standardized terms would harm consumers as a group if the standardized
contract is the most efficient way to sustain a separating equilibrium. This will be the subject of the following Part.44
Before scholars can attempt to investigate whether the bounded
rationality model of form contracts fits the data better than these
competing stories (or others that have not been mentioned), it is necessary to identify the comparative statistics yielded by Korobkin’s
argument. A theory must be predictive of variation to be powerful. As

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 1240.
See id.
See id. at 1235.
See infra Part III.
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discussed above, our relative ignorance of the microfoundations of
behavioral biases limits our ability to derive formal comparative statistics; improvement on this front will allow researchers to craft more
powerful empirical tests. However, Korobkin’s article provides some
clues as to what underlying variables should correlate well with systematic limitations in rationality.
For example, since it appears that individuals with superior cognitive abilities can evaluate more product dimensions,45 we should
expect that the likelihood of inefficient standardized terms decreases
as average customer cognitive ability increases.
Another covariate suggested by Korobkin’s work involves consumer heterogeneity.46 As variance in salience profiles in the market
increases, we should expect that fewer terms are immune from competitive pressures. This implies that markets with increasingly heterogeneous consumers should exhibit fewer inefficient standardized
terms.
Lastly, despite Korobkin’s pessimism regarding the ability of
reputation concerns to remedy inefficient standardized terms,47 on
the margin, we should observe a lower likelihood of inefficient terms
as average consumer experience in the market increases. That is,
even with very small probability events, the more exposure consumers have in a market, the higher the cumulative probability of an individually small probability event occurring. As such an event occurs
for more individuals (and as publicity of these events spreads), we
get closer to the tipping point between salient and non-salient for the
inefficient standardized term.
Greg Mitchell offers some other sources of variation in behavioral
bias in general.48 Some of these might prove to be systematically important in determining deviations from rationality in the contract context specifically. Among these differences are sex differences,49 disposition differences,50 cultural differences,51 and developmental differences.52 Identifying the specific correlations between these characteristics and the increasing propensity to make boundedly rational decisions in contract-context experiments would help researchers develop
powerful tests once they are ready to analyze field data.
45. See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1227-28 & n.83 (citing Olshavsky, supra note 21,
at 314; Onken et al., supra note 22).
46. See id. at 1236-39.
47. See id. at 1239-41.
48. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 139-60
(2002).
49. Id. at 140-42.
50. Id. at 142-47.
51. Id. at 147-56.
52. Id. at 156-60.
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III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION THROUGH STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
Price discrimination occurs when multiple units of the “same”
good are sold at unequal prices either to the same customer or to
multiple customers.53 Although many discussions of price discrimination assume a significant degree of monopoly power on the part of the
discriminator, price discrimination can exist in a zero-profit equilibrium in which total consumer welfare is improved relative to the
nondiscriminatory case.54 For example, in markets where suppliers
must pay a fixed cost before they can sell a product, each seller’s
price must contain a return on the initial investment.55 If that return
represents an economic profit, other firms will find it advantageous
to enter the market, pushing the return down to the prevailing opportunity cost of funds. If firms can separate submarkets composed
of low and high demanders, they can increase their up-front investment by recouping more of the investment from the high demanders
and less from the low demanders. This price discrimination increases
total output relative to the pooled equilibrium, increasing total welfare.
In the monopolistic case, price discrimination allows the producer
to extract more surplus from its trades, and consumer welfare can be
increased relative to the nondiscriminatory monopoly case because of
the attendant output increase that results from the discrimination.56
In the extreme case of first-degree price discrimination, the competitive output is produced as each consumer is charged his reservation
price for each unit of the good.57
Without making any assumptions about the underlying market
structures in which we observe standardized contracts,58 I conjecture
that standardized contracts provide a mechanism by which firms can
engage in second-degree price discrimination. Specifically, if a firm
serves customers with varying time preferences, it can use its contracts to extract greater surplus from high-time-value individuals,
who are unwilling to dicker over multiple contract terms, without
losing low-time-value customers, who are willing to bargain in order

53. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 (1988).
54. Id. at 139.
55. For an illustration of this in the pharmaceutical industry, see Jonathan Klick,
Drug Re-Importation’s No-Win Solution, REGULATION, Spring 2002, at 6.
56. The dynamic efficiency of this outcome is questionable given that if the monopoly
position is sustainable, firms will dissipate the expected rents in trying to secure the monopoly. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967).
57. TIROLE, supra note 53, at 136.
58. Indeed, it may well be the case that both zero-profit and monopoly-profit industries use standardized contracts to price discriminate.
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to get the product at a lower real price. Effectively, bargaining is
analogous to clipping coupons to get a better deal on a product.59
For illustration purposes, I modify a model first proposed by Raymond Chiang and Chester Spatt.60 In that model, consumers differ in
terms of their reservation price and time values.61 In order to extract
more surplus from the high-time-value types, the seller bundles his
good with a “bad” (for example, time spent waiting), allowing individuals to trade off time for a lower price.62 The model is presented in
general terms, so Chiang and Spatt do not specify how time is traded
for a lower price in the mathematics; but they offer some examples in
their text, such as selling a good for a lower price in outlets that are
located farther away from the majority of the population, charging
more in outlets that have shorter wait times, or allowing bargaining
over price.63 They also allow for generality concerning the number of
consumer types, requiring only that the number be finite.64
To apply the model to the form contract context, I impose a bit
more structure on the model and I restrict attention to two types of
consumers: high-time-value individuals and low-time-value individuals. Further, to simplify the discussion, I assume that there are only
two customers: one of each type. Lastly, with respect to the customers, I assume that the high-time-value individual also has a high reservation price for the good, while the low-time-value person has a
lower reservation price for the good.65 Thus, customer 1 values time
at H units (measured in terms of a numeraire good) per unit of time
spent waiting (t) and has a reservation value for the good of vH . Customer 2 values time at L units (again denominated in the numeraire)
per t and has a reservation value of vL . Ex ante the seller cannot distinguish between the two types, but he knows the underlying parameter values.
The seller of the good chooses the nominal price (p) and initially
offers contract terms such that the real price of the good is
β ( t = 0 ) p = p . That is, if there is no bargaining (and thus t = 0), the
consumer simply takes the offered (and presumably “abusive”) contract terms and pays an effective price of p. However, if the consumer
59. See Chakravarthi Narasimhan, A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons, 3
MARKETING SCI. 128 (1984).
60. See Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 (1982).
61. Id. at 157-67.
62. Id. at 155-57.
63. Id. at 155.
64. Id. at 157.
65. This restriction is imposed solely to expedite the discussion. As shown in the more
general model presented by Chiang and Spatt, dropping these restrictions generates conclusions that carry the same intuition.
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spends time bargaining, he can improve the contract terms such that
β (t > 0) p < p . That is, his real price will be less than the nominal
price because the governing contract terms will be more favorable to
him if he spends time bargaining. Presumably there is some minimum real price that serves as the seller’s reservation price, which
will serve as the stopping point for the seller.
The seller’s maximization problem will then be to develop a form
contract and nominal sales price that generate the highest profit
from the two customers. If we assume that the customers do not differ in their bargaining abilities,66 the seller will develop a bargaining
β (t ) p
that maximizes the following equation:
schedule
β ( t1 ) p + β ( t 2 ) p − ϕ ⋅ ( t1 + t 2 ) − 2 ⋅ C , where ϕ represents the seller’s
per unit time cost and C represents the constant cost of production.
In the way I have set up the maximand, if the seller chooses not to
price discriminate, he will simply choose the p that maximizes profit
with zero time spent bargaining. Assuming an interior solution, this
p will be equal to the low person’s value if 2 ⋅ vL > vH , or it will be
equal to the high person’s value if vH > 2 ⋅ vL . However, under a
range of conditions, the seller might be able to improve his profit if
he price discriminates.
To effectively price discriminate, the seller needs to impose four
additional conditions on his maximization problem. First, he needs to
include participation constraints for each buyer, such that each is
better off purchasing the good than not purchasing the good. Thus:

vH − β ( t1 ) p − Ht1 > 0
vL − β ( t2 ) p − Lt2 > 0

Also, to avoid the possibility that either customer will find it advantageous to select the contract that was meant for the other customer, the seller must impose self-selection or incentive-compatibility
constraints such that:

vH − β ( t1 ) p − Ht1 > vH − β ( t2 ) p − Ht2
vL − β ( t2 ) p − Lt2 > vL − β ( t1 ) p − Lt1
Given the assumptions about the relevant parameters, only the
low-value customer’s participation constraint and the high-value customer’s self-selection constraint will bind. That is, there is no rele-

66. Bargaining ability presumably includes the speed of reading the contract and
comprehension of the terms (that is, the ability to price the terms). This assumption could
be relaxed in a more general model, but the underlying intuition would not change.
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vant set of contracts and prices that would entice the low-value person to purchase the good without also enticing the high-value person
to purchase the good (given that the seller also values time). Further,
there is no concern that the low-value person will attempt to pose as
the high-value person.
Assuming that a separating equilibrium exists, the seller’s strategy can be represented by the following graph:

In the graph, A and C represent the two contracts that will be offered
in the separating equilibrium. The high-value customer will pay the
nominal price, will not bargain over any of the contract terms, and
will reach the A contract terms, while the low-value customer will invest time bargaining to reach the C contract terms. Effectively, the
seller exploits the consumers’ differences in time values to induce
them to reveal their value type, earning greater profits than he
would make if he chose either of the pooling contracts individually
(A, where he sells just to the high-value person, or B, where he sells
to both people at a lower effective price).
Whether this price discrimination scheme is stable depends on the
underlying market. If some fixed cost is required to operate in this
market, this strategy could be sustainable and even the second most
efficient, as there may be no economic rents accruing to the seller in
the long term. Short-term revenues would simply serve as the normal return for the up-front investment. If revenues yielded an economic profit, other firms would undertake the fixed cost to enter the
market, but there is no reason why a separating equilibrium would
not be sustainable. Obviously, if there are stronger barriers to entry,
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the firm could sustain the separating equilibrium and earn economic
profits.
While this price discrimination argument is consistent with standardized contract terms that do not favor consumers, it is not necessarily superior to Korobkin’s explanation (or other explanations yet
to be identified). As discussed in the section on his behavioral bias
explanation, it is necessary to identify what this model predicts
about cross-sectional variation.
Two components of the model are very helpful in terms of comparing its predictive power relative to Korobkin’s. First, while Korobkin’s model implies that abusive standardized terms should be more
likely to appear when consumers are more homogenous,67 the price
discrimination model suggests that abusive terms are more likely
when consumer heterogeneity is greater. That is, a separating equilibrium is more likely to be optimal when there is relatively high
variance in consumer preferences. In Korobkin’s illustrations, it is
clear that homogeneity in preferences will imply that relatively more
product attributes are non-salient.68 Thus, in empirical research, the
two hypotheses have directly opposite predictions about the correlation between consumer heterogeneity and the incidence of abusive
standardized terms.69
The second component of the price discrimination model that
could be exploited is the requirement that there are no arbitrage opportunities. That is, if resale of the product is relatively easy, lowtime-value consumers could acquire the product at the lower effective
price and then resell it to the high-value consumers. Such arbitrage
opportunities will make the price discrimination equilibrium unstable, and the seller will default to one of the pooling equilibriums.
This component is useful because there is no obvious connection between ease of resale and Korobkin’s behavioral bias explanation.
While the behavioral explanation implies no correlation between arbitrage opportunities and abusive standardized terms, the price dis-

67. Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1235-39.
68. See id.
69. Some of Korobkin’s comments delivered in this Symposium, where this Article
was first presented, suggest a useful testable implication of the price discrimination model.
Specifically, Korobkin mentioned that we might expect more niche marketing in a price
discrimination context. My interpretation of this comment is that it would be possible to
exploit systematic differences between high- and low-time-value individuals to proxy for
discount rates in examining the relationship between the incidence of form contracts and
time values. For example, if we make the plausible assumption that only low-time-value
individuals will be willing to shop at specialty stores (because specialty stores entail more
search costs and do not allow for economies of scale in shopping) while both types will be
willing to shop at “one-stop” shopping outlets, we might expect a higher incidence of “abusive” form contract terms at the latter outlets relative to the former if the price discrimination model is predictive.
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crimination model suggests that there should be fewer abusive standardized terms in markets where resale is easy.70
IV. CONCLUSION
While I am not aware of any comprehensive dataset, aggregated
at either the firm or the industry level, empirical testing is clearly
important before we advance policy prescriptions regarding the
treatment of standardized terms in the courts. While we might wish
to protect consumers from their cognitive biases (though we should
worry about the attendant moral hazard), it is not obvious that we
should be troubled by a seller’s ability to induce consumers to selfselect the deal that they want on the basis of their time preferences.
Indeed, this kind of price discrimination takes place in many forms
without prompting condemnation. If standard form contracts serve
the same purpose as coupons,71 it probably does not make sense to
discourage them through the courts.
As a broader matter, we need to be more hesitant in using insights from psychology to rationalize unexpected empirical observations ex post. In gaining from interdisciplinary trade with the field of
psychology, law and economics scholars must be careful to retain the
virtues that have made economics the imperial science. Careful ex
ante specification generates testable hypotheses about cross-sectional
and time-series variation and allows us to construct powerful statistical tests. Failure to confirm a particular hypothesis does not immediately suggest that a different hypothesis is correct even if experimental evidence suggests that it is consistent with what we observe.
Instead, we should allow experimental evidence to suggest alternate
hypotheses and to inform our modeling assumptions, but specifying a
model is still important if we hope to develop powerful tests. These
are all necessary conditions for generating robust and effective policy
prescriptions.

70. To illustrate, the price discrimination model would be consistent with the casual
observation that rental services (for example, car rentals, hotels, and the like) appear to
exhibit a relatively high incidence of potentially abusive standardized terms, given that resale of rental services is fairly difficult. For that matter, we might expect that services, in
general, are more likely to come bundled with abusive terms than are goods, since resale is
easier with goods.
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (analogizing bargaining to clipping coupons).

